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 O presente estudo analisa as melhores variáveis para prever uma crise bancária na 
União Europeia, focando-se especialmente no crescimento do crédito bancário a particulares 
e empresas. A amostra é constituída por dados anuais de 1960 até 2016 de onze países, todos 
pertencentes à UE antes da Crise Financeira de 2007-2009. Os modelos logit e OLS linear 
probability foram utilizados para avaliar que variáveis influenciam a probabilidade de 
ocorrência de uma crise bancária e, posteriormente, para analisar as variáveis mais 
impactantes na evolução do crédito a sociedades não financeiras. Os resultados evidenciam 
que quando o crédito bancário está a crescer há quatro anos, a probabilidade de ocorrência 
de uma crise bancária, no ano seguinte, aumenta. Estes resultados assemelham-se ao que foi 
encontrado por Bordo & Meissner (2012) e Schularick & Taylor (2012), pois também 
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 This study examines the variables that are more appropriated to predict a banking 
crisis in the European Union, with a special focus on private credit growth. The sample is 
composed by annual data from 1960 until 2016 from eleven countries, all belonging to the 
EU prior to the Global Financial Crisis. It is used the logit and the OLS linear probability 
models to assess what variables influence the likelihood of a banking crisis and, afterwards, 
to analyze which variables influence the evolution of private credit. The results provide 
evidence that when credit is growing for four years, the probability of facing a banking crisis, 
in the following year, increases. This finding is similar to what was found by Bordo & 
Meissner (2012) and Schularick & Taylor (2012), as they also argue that credit booms are 
good estimators of financial crisis. 
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Financial crisis represents a period in which the banking sector of a country is 
facing systemic bank panics and significant output losses that lead to bankruptcy, forced 
mergers among financial institutions and government interventions (Schularick & Taylor, 
2012). One of the most harmful financial crises in history was the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) of 2007-2009, that unveiled all existing problems of the global financial system. 
This crisis stimulated a new interest on understanding the impact that credit and money 
variations could have on macroeconomy and their explanatory role in generating and 
expanding shocks throughout time (Schularick & Taylor, 2012). The GFC started with 
the bust of the US housing bubble and quickly spread to the rest of the world. Banking 
crises are an “equal opportunity to menace” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2013), as they affect 
both developed and developing countries, and the GFC was no exception. This banking 
crisis resulted from a combination of economic and financial elements, related to poor 
risk management strategies (Restoy, 2017).  
In Europe, due to the tight connection between both, the GFC evolved into a 
sovereign debt crisis, which worsened its economic position. The original design of the 
Euro is considered one of its causes, since it was not considered its fragility under 
unexpected environments, making all the EU countries unprepared for these types of 
events (Lane, 2012). It is also considered as a cause, the unregulated amount of external 
borrowings that emerged after the elimination of exchange rate risk within the monetary 
union (Cardão-Pito & Baptista, 2017). 
In response to the GFC, worldwide authorities had to create a set of regulatory reforms 
that would reduce significantly the likelihood of a future financial crisis and moderate its 





damaging impact, if one occurs (Restoy, 2017). The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision developed Basel III, which is an extension of Basel II framework, with the 
aim of strengthening regulation, supervision and risk management of banks. Its standards 
are minimum requirements that must be implemented by the committee members in a 
predefined timeframe. Due to the importance of regulation, in the EU was established a 
new European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), composed by three supervisory 
authorities: European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRM). The ESFS aims to reinforce European 
supervisory provisions to protect its citizens and to rebuild the creditability of the 
European financial system (Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010). 
Banking crises cannot be fully predicted by a single variable, due to their 
complexity (Hedin & Johansson, 2017). However, several authors have been able to 
identify which variables increase, or lessen, the likelihood of a banking crisis. Private 
credit growth is one of the key variables with a positive relation to banking crises 
(Schularick & Taylor, 2012; Bordo & Meissner, 2012). If the latter rises, the probability 
of having a crisis follows the same pattern. The type of credit is also important, and there 
is evidence that mortgage loans have a higher predicting ability (Jordà et al., 2014; 
Kirschenmann et al.,2016). This loan type aggregates the total amount of credit secured 
by real estate, which leads us to believe that the prices of the latter could also influence 
financial crises. Previous literature confirms this belief, as house prices contribute to the 
likelihood of crisis (Kemme & Roy (2012); Lainà et al., 2015). Other authors go beyond 
credit booms and house prices, and study the influence of complementary macro, 





financial and external indicators, like GDP, short-term interest rates, terms of trade and 
current account (Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 2010; Hamdaoui, 2016).  
Since the GFC, the literature on financial crises has grown substantially. It has 
been approached by academics, regulators and specialists in finance and economics, who 
use different methods and databases to analyze various components that may have 
contributed to the crisis. Despite of all existing information, this subject requires constant 
updates, as it relies on the economy, which never stops changing.  
Most of the existing literature tends to study samples that include information 
from a large set of countries throughout a very long-time period. Datasets that focus on a 
smaller group of countries or on a smaller time frame can detect other weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities, contributing with new information to this research area. 
This paper assesses the predicting abilities of several variables, with a special 
focus on private credit growth. My panel data includes information on eleven EU 
countries from 1960 until 2016. Besides credit, it will also be investigated the predicting 
abilities of 10 additional variables, among house prices, real GDP per capita and current 
account. This set of variables will be tested twice. Firstly, to examine if they influence 
the likelihood of a banking crisis and secondly, to analyze if they can explain credit 
growth.  
In my research methodology, I analyze a sample containing 17 episodes of 
financial crisis in order to test if credit growth can increase the likelihood of a systemic 
banking crisis. My findings are in accordance with previous literature, as I find that 
private credit growth over the previous four years is a good indicator. 





This paper is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a more detailed 
literature review on this subject. Chapter three summarizes the main predicting variables 
found in earlier studies. Chapter four describes the hypothesis under analysis. Chapter 
five defines the variables and describes the methodologies used to perform the statistical 
tests. Chapter six presents the analysis’ results and finally, chapter seven discloses the 
conclusions and proposals to future research. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Global Financial Crisis 
The past decade has been a period of change, new supervision and regulation. The 
GFC of 2007-2009 was the reason for these developments in the global economy. The 
impact of the GFC emphasizes the importance of understanding financial crises, to avoid 
a similar financial turmoil and in the case of a new one, to prepare macroeconomists and 
policymakers for the chain of events following crises (Jordà et al., 2014).  
The aftermath of severe financial crises has three common features.  The first one 
is the profound and long-lasting decrease in the asset market, as house and equity prices 
decline, on average, 35.5% and 56% over a six-year and a three-and-a-half-year period, 
respectively. The second is the deep contraction in output and employment, over a 
downturn span of four and two years, correspondingly. Lastly, the colossal increase in 
government debt, 86% on average, mainly linked to the crash in tax revenues, which was 
a foreseeable consequence of the crisis, and to the escalation of government spending to 
control and fight the recession (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Financial crises are rare events in developed economies (Jordà et al., 2015; 
Kirschenmann et al., 2016). Claessens & Kose (2013) discuss the most relevant types of 





financial crises and they group them into four categories. Firstly, there are currency crises, 
which involve a sharp depreciation of the currency due to speculation. Secondly, sudden 
stop crises, that occur when international capital inflows decrease drastically. The third 
type is the debt crises, which take place when the government does not honor its debt 
obligations. And finally, the last type identified corresponds to banking crises, which are 
triggered by bank runs and, can lead to bank panics being, typically, followed by large 
output losses (Jonghe, 2010).  
These several types of financial crises can interact between themselves. For 
instance, Laeven & Valencia (2012) argue that banking, currency and debt crises can arise 
simultaneously, notwithstanding the higher frequency of occurrence of the twin crises 
associated with currency crises. 
Banking crises are the most common type of financial crises due to the fragility 
of the banking system associated to its intrinsic role, the maturity transformation 
(Claessens & Kose, 2013). The maturity transformation is the conversion of short-term 
deposits into long-term loans (Persaud, 2016; Drechsler et al., 2017). When a high number 
of depositors’ savings are withdrawn, i.e when a bank run occurs, it is very likely that the 
financial intermediary will become insolvent (Claessens & Kose, 2013). Bank panics are 
not irrational events, they happen when there is information that a recession is coming, 
and the depositors act according to this insight o1n the market (Gorton, 2012). 
Barth et al. (2010) believes that banks were at the center of the GFC leading to 
the bankruptcy of several commercial and investment banks which, nearly, collapsed the 
whole banking system. This chain of events is defined as a systemic banking crisis (Lainà 
et al., 2015). However, it was not only banks that contributed to the financial crisis, one 





must consider the role of the new financial channels (Claessens & Kose, 2013). One of 
the most relevant financial intermediaries were shadow banks (Greenwood & Scharfstein, 
2012; McCulley, 2009), which perform credit, liquidity and maturity transformation 
without needing to access central bank’s liquidity and public sector’s guarantees (Pozsar, 
2010). In his exact words, McCulley (2009) states that “unregulated shadow banks fund 
themselves with uninsured short-term funding, which may or may not be backstopped by 
liquidity lines from real banks”. He also argues that the “shadow banking system is 
particularly vulnerable to runs”, which resembles typical banks. 
The subprime crisis takes its origin in the burst of the real estate bubble in the U.S 
in 2007 (Candelon et al., 2010; Hein & Truger, 2012; Jordà et al., 2015) and it gained 
strength with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September of the following year 
(Hein & Truger, 2012). This crisis amplified substantially the level of instability of the 
financial system, due to the excessive mortgage lending (André, 2016). As shown by 
Jordà et al., (2014), mortgage loans represented about two thirds of all U.S bank lending, 
at the end of 2007. Besides affecting the U.S. financial system, it also disturbed the 
financial systems of numerous European countries and others around the world due to the 
interconnectedness of financial markets (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2010). 
However, the banking crisis did not affect all countries equally, Rose & Spiegel 
(2011) find that the richest countries and the ones who experienced a large rise in the 
stock market in the pre-crisis period, were the ones who suffered the most. Bulbarelli 
(2016) reaches another conclusion when analyzing two European countries, Spain and 
Italy. The author finds that, despite of the several commonalities, the different degree of 
financialization and deregulation led to the creation of a housing bubble in Spain, which 
worsened its economic health after the financial turmoil, compared to Italy.  





Figure 1 resumes the process of the Global Financial Crisis, what led to it and its 
consequences in Europe. The following two sub-sections will detail further the aftermath 
of the GFC and its causes, proposing different points of view on what happened. 
 
2.2 The aftermath 
In Europe, the GFC transformed into a sovereign debt crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2013.a). The GFC recession, aside from weakening their banking systems, uncovered 
several economic and financial problems, such as the unsustainability of the public 
finances of some EU countries, making these economies more vulnerable to shocks 
(Bořuta, 2011). 
The increase in unemployment was one of them, and since it impacts public 
finances, it contributed to high primary deficits and to a sharp rising in sovereign debt, 
which then evolved into a crisis (Bořuta, 2011). Lane (2012) blames the sovereign debt, 
its origin and propagation, to the original design of the Euro since it was not considered 
its fragility under unexpected environments, making all the EU countries not ready for 
such events. If it had been implemented according to institutions, mechanisms and 
regulations, several harmful economic incidents could have been avoided (Cardão-Pito & 
Baptista, 2017). 
Figure 1- Global Financial Crisis Process 





Cardão-Pito & Baptista (2017) focus on the Portuguese case and they argue that, 
following the elimination of the exchange rate risk within the Eurozone, the Euro 
implementation gave Portugal the access to low interest rates and excess liquidity in 
financial markets, which probably increased credit risk in its economy. These two 
elements contributed to the capital-flow bonanza and boom-bust cycles, that increased 
exponentially the level of public and private debt, making the Portuguese banking system 
very incapacitated when the GFC arrived. 
2.3 Causes of the GFC 
Financial crises are difficult to characterize since they do not depend only on one 
variable. Vuković (2011) argues that there has not been a consensus regarding the causes 
of the global financial crisis, although two opposing views have been defined and their 
key distinction relies on the reaction to the crisis. The free market approach defends that 
the lax monetary policy led to the housing bubble and excessive regulation, and the (New) 
Keynesian blame the GFC on the lack of financial regulation and excessive profit seeking 
in Wall Street. 
Prior to the crisis, several supporters of deregulation believed that financial 
institutions could regulate themselves through the activities of market participants. 
Consequently, governments were not willing to adopt new regulation or to analyze the 
industry, looking for problems that needed to be solved. Excessive regulation was 
associated to poor financial performance, subsequently the regulatory institutions and 
their supervisors did not want to restrain financial institutions by creating constrains on 
credit availability (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011).  





 Free-marketers claim that the banks’ risky behavior was instigated by 
overregulation. Regulators were imposing housing policies, tax cuts and bank capital 
restrictions which provided the right incentives to banks to enhance their assets with 
mortgage-backed securities.  These government policies led to an excessive level of debt 
accumulated, which was accompanied by house price inflation, that was already 
contributing for the growth of the financial sector (Vuković, 2011). 
Supporting the (New) Keynesians, Hein & Truger (2012) argue that deregulation 
and liberalization of international financial markets helped spread the GFC around the 
world. Besides deregulation, the increasing inequality in income distribution and the 
growing leverage of the private sector, also contributed to the crisis (Turner, 2014). 
McDonald & Stokes (2011) point as a cause, the expansive monetary policy practiced by 
the Federal Reserve, that kept interest rates low promoting reckless borrowings.  
However, not all authors agree with these statements. For instance, Dokko et al., 
(2009) claim that the “relationship between interest rates and housing activities simply is 
not strong enough to explain the rise in residential investment or house prices.”  
Returning to the general concept of financial crisis, Claessens & Kose (2013) 
explain that financial crises tend to be preceded by asset and credit booms that turn into 
busts, due to the unsustainability associated to these sharp evolutions. Asset price bubbles 
might be driven by the collective mispricing, associated to expected future returns; and 
by micro and macro distortions, such as the default of agents that borrow to invest and do 
not find high enough rates of return. Regarding credit booms, these can be driven by 
positive shocks in productivity that emerge when GDP is growing; by accommodative 
monetary policies, as investors and other agents take on more risk; and by drastic 





increases in international financial flows, which can be bad if these flows merge the 
adverse foreign economic conditions into the national panorama. Having the instability 
scenario created, a small shock in the economic and financial conditions can burst the 
bubbles and lead to the financial turmoil. 
Jordà et al., (2014) demonstrate that credit booms that fuel asset price bubbles, 
especially the ones associated to the housing market, have a higher likelihood to generate 
a financial crisis, just like what happened with the GFC. 
Acharya & Richardson (2009) support the last authors’ arguments by claiming 
that the financial crisis was caused by the combination of a credit boom with a housing 
bubble. Their paper evidences other factors that contributed to the crisis, like the loans 
granted to people that could not repay them and the structured securitized mortgages rated 
with overwhelming ratings, misleading investors. Despite these contributions, the main 
cause identified was, in their exact words, “the behavior of many large, complex financial 
institutions (…) that dominate the financial industry”, since these financial institutions 
chose to absorb all levels of credit risk, making them more vulnerable to market shocks.  
According to Acosta-González et al., (2011), the GFC could have been avoided. 
Their empirical studies demonstrate that the intensity of the crisis seems to be related to 
financial factors that had suggested the market about the possibility of a financial crisis 
since 2006. However, these warnings were not taken seriously.  
Numerous economists and policymakers ignored the bubble claiming that it did 
not exist and blamed the run-ups on the housing values and mortgage debts on other 
factors (Jordà et al., 2015).  Fundamentally, they failed to recognize and manage all the 
risks that could affect the well-being of Americans and, subsequently, of the rest of the 





world (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Reinhart & Rogoff (2013.a) argue 
that prior to 2008, wealthy economies were assumed to be strong enough to face financial 
crises, however in a previous study they found that, on average, the number of banking 
crises and their incidence is “remarkably similar in the high- and middle-to-low-income 
countries” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2013), contradicting this belief. 
After realizing the massive damage caused by the global financial crisis, 
policymakers need to pay more attention to signals that may indicate future crises, to 
improve financial stability (Hedin & Johansson, 2017). Financial crises are very difficult 
to predict due to their complexity; however previous literature was able to identify 
warning indictors for the latter (Hedin & Johansson, 2017). 
3. Predictors of financial crises 
Table I summarizes the analyzed literature exhibiting the direct and indirect 
explanatory indicators of financial crises found in each paper and the respective data and 
estimation models to reach such results. 
Jordà et al., (2014) analyzes disaggregated bank credit and find that a rapid 
expansion on mortgage and non-mortgage lending increases the likelihood of financial 
crises, being the first type the strongest predicting variable. It is also demonstrated that 
mortgage credit dynamics affect business cycles, and since they are gaining strength 
among the financial sector, this has become a very important indicator to consider when 
designing macro-prudential policies. When the growth of mortgage loans reflects an 
increase on the leverage levels of households, associated to the increase in asset values, 
highly indebted household portfolios will emerge and may increase the fragility of the 





financial system (Jordà et al., 2014). This frailty makes the latter more vulnerable to 
economic shocks and it creates an environment prone to banking crisis. 
Table I - Main Indicators and models used in previous literature 
 
In a previous study1, it was found that total credit is the best financial crises 
predictor and that external imbalances increase, to some extent, this predictability. Credit 
expansions are often related to optimistic expectations regarding future income. 
                                                 
1 See Jordà et al., (2011) 
Authors Main explanatory 
indicators 
Data  Method 
Büyükkarabacak & 
Valev (2010) 
Credit, bank debt, GDP, 
interest rate, 
M2/reserves 
37 developed and 
developing countries 
from 1990 to 2007  
Logit 
Bordo & Meissner 
(2012) 
Credit, GDP and interest 
rate 
14 countries from 1880 to 
2008 
OLS and Logit 
Schularick & 
Taylor (2012) 
Credit 14 developed countries 
from 1870 to 2008 
OLS, Logit 
and ROC 
Kemme & Roy 
(2012) 
House prices  U.S from 1950 to 2005 VEC, Logit 
and Probit 
Jordà et al. (2014) Mortgage and non-
mortgage lending 
17 advanced countries 
from 1870 to 2011 
Logit 
Lainà et al. (2015) Loan-to-deposits and 
house prices 
11 EU countries from 




Hamdaoui (2016) Terms of trade, capital 
flows, real interest rate, 
current account and 
financial exposure 









inequality and current 
account 
14 developed countries 
from 1870 to 2008 
Logit and ROC 





Büyükkarabacak & Valev (2010) argue that enterprises and households are willing to 
carry a greater level of debt, when they expect a considerable growth in their income. 
Hence, if a sharp rise in credit can improve long-term income, borrowers will continue to 
carry their debt levels. However, if that does not happen, i.e. if the liability levels are 
higher than the income generated, interest rates will increase, and a deterioration of asset 
prices or an adverse income shock may increase the probability of a systemic financial 
crisis (Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 2010). Credit booms can also emerge when the real 
wages of low-income households decrease, as they will borrow to maintain their level of 
consumption and their living standards (Bordo & Meissner, 2012). 
Schularick & Taylor (2012) contribute to this research area by studying the 
changes of the financial system and their repercussions on financial stability and 
monetary policy. Gathering information of 14 developed countries over 140 years, they 
generated a long run database that was used in subsequent papers to further analyze 
financial crises’ predictors (Jordà et al., 2014; Kirschenmann et al., 2016). Applying the 
logit and the OLS linear probability models, they find that credit booms are the main 
predictor of financial crises, including the booms over the preceding five years. However, 
these booms are not a perfect indicator, as they might be triggered by economic growth 
and, therefore, are not always related to financial instability (Schularick & Taylor, 2012). 
They also find evidence that the size of the financial sector impacts the stability of the 
financial system (the bigger the riskier) and that asset booms, especially stock market 
booms, are more challenging when they occur in larger financial systems.  
Büyükkarabacak & Valev (2010) study the influence of household and enterprise 
credit on banking crises, analyzing 37 developed and emerging economies from 1990 to 
2007. The main difference between these two types of credit is the income generation 





produced by firm credit expansions, which counterbalances for the vulnerabilities 
associated with the rise in debt (Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 2010). They find that credit 
expansions are accompanied by an increase in the probability of having banking crises 
and that, from the two types of loans, the growth of credit to business is the strongest 
predictor.  
Regarding other variables included, Büyükkarabacak & Valev (2010) argue that 
economies with a lower income level, with high ratios of M2 to reserves, high interest 
rates and extremely large amounts of external bank debt are more susceptible to face a 
financial crisis. Poorer economies are generally weaker, as they produce less output and 
consequently, generate less income. As a repercussion, investment and employment will 
decrease, real wages might follow this market trend and ultimately, households will save 
and borrow less affecting directly banks’ activities. Any shock in these elements, may 
have severe consequences for the economy as that country does not have enough liquidity 
to absorb the negative impact of the latter. Financial fragility can also appear during the 
upswing of a cycle, i.e when GDP is growing, as the loans’ risks might become 
underestimated, leading to a rapid expansion of credit (Kelly et al., 2013). Therefore, the 
number of non-performing loans may increase, making the banks’ balance sheets weaker 
and more vulnerable to negative shocks. 
The M2 to reserves ratio, above presented, divides the total money supply of a 
country over the total amount of foreign exchange reserves. The latter is composed by the 
reserves in foreign currency that each country’s Central Bank has as a backup fund in the 
case of a sudden deterioration of the national currency. Therefore, this ratio captures the 
vulnerability that banks have towards runs linked to currency crises (Büyükkarabacak & 





Valev, 2010). And as said earlier, bank runs can be very dangerous as they are followed 
by large output losses which might lead to a banking crisis. 
Bordo & Meissner (2012) focus on the role of income inequality on crises, with 
the aim of validating previous literature on this matter. Using a database with 14 
countries, the authors analyze the predicting ability of credit on banking crises and 
afterwards, they identify the most significant determinants of credit growth. They find 
that credit expansions have a positive relation with financial crises and that income 
inequality has no association to credit growth, unlike GDP and low interest-rates. Interest 
rates are an interesting variable as it affects directly the debtor’s solvency. When it 
reaches high values, it will weaken the debtor’s financial viability and capability to pay 
debt’s interest (Hamdaoui, 2016). Bordo & Meissner (2012) argue that when low interest 
rates reflect inflationary expectations, credit booms are more likely to occur. 
Kirschenmann et al., (2016), using the same dataset as Schularick & Taylor 
(2012), finds the opposite results as Bordo & Meissner (2012 , as income inequality 
appears to have a strong statistical significance in predicting crises, even if it is considered 
independently, i.e. not by its possible impact on credit growth. The difference on the 
results of these two papers can be explained by the variety of channels that income 
inequality may affect financial stability (Kirschenmann et al., 2016). Other variables like 
real bank loans and current account imbalances were also considered to be relevant in 
explaining crises. 
Usually a current account deficit occurs simultaneously with a trade balance 
deficit, and the latter might increase the probability of a banking crisis as it negatively 
impacts the borrowers’ ability to fulfill their debt obligations, particularly those in the 





tradable sector (Hamdaoui, 2016; Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 2010). A trade deficit 
implies that either the export prices are decreasing, or the import prices are increasing, 
assuming that all else is equal. Either way, the overall wealthiness will decrease which 
might affect banks’ balance sheets, as the amount of savings will drop and the level of 
default loans may increase, generating, once again, an unstable environment in 
the financial system. However, a current account deficit can stem from a rise in imports 
regarding exports, when a certain country is importing more to increase its productivity 
and, consequently, to be able to export and become a more compatible country in the 
market. In this case, a current account deficit is not a negative measure as it is associated 
to economic development and growth. As so, it is necessary to understand where current 
account imbalances are coming from, when analyzing its imbalances, because a deficit in 
this variable does not necessarily means that it will have negative repercussion for the 
economy. 
Lainà et al., (2015) analyzes the behavior of several variables in 11 European 
Union countries to assess the leading indicators of systemic banking crises and the 
optimal lead-time. For that matter, it was used two different models, that generated 
complementary conclusions. It is demonstrated, with the logit model, that loans-to-
deposits ratio and real house price growth are the strongest indicators. Inflation and 
current account imbalances were considered weaker elements, due to the lack of evidence 
concerning their predicting abilities. With the signal extraction method, Lainà et al., 
(2015) find that every indicator with a lead time of 3 years is very useful for policymakers, 
which strengths Kemme & Roy’s (2012) findings. 
Focusing on the significant variables found by Lainà et al., (2015), loans-to-
deposits ratio is a complementary variable to total credit, as it indicates the liquidity of 





banks by considering the total level of deposits. When the total amount of deposits is not 
enough to meet the population's credit needs, banks have to be financed through other 
sources of capital that are generally riskier than deposits, like investments in the financial 
market. Additionally, a sharp increase in this ratio may indicate that the banking system 
is nearly facing bank runs, which increases the probability of a banking crises. 
As credit booms, asset price boom can also be driven by expectations. Some 
historical episodes of financial booms were associated to the expectation that asset prices 
would increase indefinitely, and consequently more houses were bought which raised 
even further these assets’ price (Kemme & Roy, 2012). As house prices increased and 
credit was more easily available, borrowers liquidity started to decrease since they could 
not repay their mortgage loans, increasing the level of non-performing loans and the 
amount of real estate properties on banks’ balance sheet, which lead to an extreme level 
of instability of the baking system. This snow-ball effect was, and still is, unsustainable 
and very dangerous if it is not followed by an increase in income, which can tone down 
its costs. 
Kemme & Roy (2012) aim to statistically confirm some of the Shiller’s (2005, 
2008) observations regarding the increasing house prices and their influence in the 
financial and economic systems. They find that changes in income, population, building 
costs and long-term interest rates are not able to explain the exorbitant house price 
increase in the U.S since 1998, like it was suggested by Shiller (2005). Using the logit 
and probit models on a dataset containing several advanced economies, they demonstrate 
that housing booms can forecast financial crises and that it is possible to create an early 
warning system in four countries, U.S, Spain, Britain and Ireland, since reliable signals 
for banking crises can be emitted three years beforehand. 





Hamdaoui (2016) argues that banking crises occur in the expansion phase of the 
business cycle as their study demonstrates that terms of trade, capital flows and financial 
exposure are very good predicting variables. Other indicators like real interest rates, 
current account and GDP per capita, were also found to be significant. In this paper, two 
models were used to perform the statistical tests, the logit model and the Bayesian Model 
Averaging. The author shows that the best predictive model is the multinomial logit 
model, as most of the banking crises during 1980 and 2010 were missed by the binomial 
logit model (Hamdaoui, 2016). 
4. Research Question 
When analyzing financial crises, policymakers and regulators must know what 
indicators they should focus to get the most complete and accurate results. Throughout 
the years, literature on this matter has grown and it was able to select key variables that 
might be fundamental for this investigation. As said earlier, the GFC begun in the U.S 
and quickly reached Europe due to globalization. However, can the inverse be possible, 
can a financial crisis start in Europe and spread around the world? The most probable 
answer is, yes. And in order to avoid such financial catastrophe, this paper aims to find 
which indicators are more appropriated to predict a financial crisis in the European Union. 
Firstly, it will be analyzed the predicting abilities of eleven variables, with the aim 
of, at least, proving that total credit growth is able to predict a financial crisis in the EU, 
by increasing its probability of occurrence. The second step focuses on credit by 
examining if a credit boom over the previous five years enhances the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. Lastly, complementing the credit growth analysis, it is crucial to 
understand which variables drive this expansion. 





5. Data and Methodology 
5.1 Sample 
The data of the sample is based on the annual dataset created by Jordà et al., 
(2017). This dataset is an updated version of the ones constructed by Jordà et al., (2011) 
and Schularick & Taylor (2012), which are commonly used in the literature 
(Kirschenmann et al., 2016; Jordà et al., 2014). The house price variable is a contribution 
from Knoll et al., (2017) and any additional information was downloaded from WDI and 
IMF databases. From Jordà’s et al., (2017) dataset, I filtered the number of countries and 
the number of years, selecting from 1960 to 2016. Table II summarizes the chosen 
countries and their respective financial crises during the time-period under analysis.  
Table II – Dates of systemic banking crises and entrance in the EU 
 








Financial crises are defined according to Schularick & Taylor (2012), and represent a 
period in which the banking sector of a country is facing systemic bank panics and 
Country Year of entry in EU Financial crisis periods 
Belgium 1958 2008 
Denmark 1973 1987, 2008 
Finland 1995 1991 
France 1958 2008 
Germany 1958 2008 
Italy 1958 1990, 2008 
Netherlands 1958 2008 
Portugal 1986 2008 
Spain 1986 1977, 2008 
Sweden 1995 1991, 2008 
United Kingdom 1973 1974, 1991, 2008 





significant output losses that lead to bankruptcy, forced mergers among financial 
institutions and government interventions. 
The United Kingdom is incorporated despite of the Brexit2, because on the current 
date, this country is still belonging to the EU. Regarding the systemic financial crisis 
dates, they are a contribute from Bordo et al., (2001) and Reinhart & Rogoff (2009.a).  
The next step was to harmonize the data to make it comparable across countries. 
In the long-run dataset, the variables that are not displayed in percentage or in an index, 
are exhibited in local currency prior to the country’s entrance in the EU. For that matter, 
some indicators, namely mortgage and non-mortgage loans, current account and terms of 
trade, were adjusted to GDP. 
The last phase of this process was to normalize the data and eliminate any existing 
trends, as is performed by Schularick & Taylor (2012). In that sense, it was computed the 
first lagged differences3 in each variable, considering only within-country variation. 
Current account and terms of trade are an exception to this transformation, as they had 
too many negative values. Therefore, it was only computed the first difference for these 
two variables. The final dataset is demonstrated in table III and the predicting variables 
are explained in the next sub-section. 
 
                                                 
2 The Brexit represents the decision that was made on 2016 by the British population, about their 
country leaving the EU (European Commission, 2016).
 
 
3 This implies computing the LN of each variable for each country in each year and, afterwards, the yearly 
changes. 





Table III - Dataset 
Time-period Countries Frequency Financial crises Predictors  




Table IV summarizes which of the variables in table I are going to be analyzed 
and the respective initials. These variables capture different elements of an economy 
which can produce meaningful analyses.  
Starting from the top, financial crisis is the dependent binary variable and its 
codification follows Schularick & Taylor (2012), by taking the value of 1 if a financial 
crisis occurs and 0, otherwise. Therefore, this is a discrete variable. The remaining 
variables are continuous, as they assume any number. 
Table IV - Variables description 
Variables Initials 
Financial Crisis CRISIS 
Real GDP per capita RGDP 
Public debt-to-GDP DEBTGDP 
Current account-to-GDP CA 
Short-term interest rate STIR 
House price  HOUSEP 
Total mortgage loans-to-GDP MORTLOAN 
Total non-mortgage loans-to-GDP NMORTLOAN 
Total credit CREDIT 
M2 to international reserves M2RESERVES 









Real GDP per capita is a very interesting predictor as it measures a country’s 
economic performance and, it is included due to the link between financial crises and the 
inefficiency of the legal systems implemented in destitute economies (Büyükkarabacak 
& Valev, 2010). Real GDP per capita is Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) per capita. Public debt-to-GDP is also included in this study despite 
of being a consequence of crises (Reinhart et al., 2012). However, there is statistical 
evidence that this variable is negatively correlated to bank credit (Bonis & Stacchini, 
2010). This ratio is the total amount of gross government debt as a percentage of its GDP 
and it demonstrates an economy’s strength, being a crucial element for the sustainability 
of government finance (OECD, 2018). These two predicting variables complement each 
other because the first one focuses on the overall economy, and the last one emphasis one 
of the most important participant in the society, the government. The previous two 
indicators, as well as the following ones, were collected from Jordà’s et al., (2017) dataset.  
Regarding credit variables, total credit is defined as the ratio between total bank 
lending and the local consumer price index. In turn, total lending is defined as the end-
of-year outstanding amount of domestic currency loans, excluding within the financial 
sector (Schularick & Taylor, 2012). This indicator is assumed to be divided into mortgage 
and non-mortgage loans, which will be also tested. Mortgage loans represent the 
aggregate of loans to households secured with real estate, and non-mortgage loans are the 
remaining value (Jordà et al., 2014).  
The current account records a country’s trading activities in the balance of 
payments covering the payments of income, exports and imports of goods and services 
and transfers among residents of that country and nonresidents (International Monetary 
Fund, 2018). A deficit in this measure implies that an economy is producing less than it 





consumes, which increases the amount of capital borrowed by this country. These flows 
may lead to market bubbles and if the level of domestic credit is exploding, then it may 
origin inflationary pressures (Kirschenmann et al., 2016). Thus, it is expected a negative 
relationship between this variable and the probability of a banking crisis. To consider the 
effect of the rates at which short-term borrowings among financial institutions are 
affected, or the rates at which government paper is issued, short-term interest rates, which 
are nominal percent per year, are included in this set.  
Despite of the information contained in the long-run dataset, the following 
variables were comprised to consider more, possible, predictors of financial crises. The 
ratio of loans-to-deposits is one of them (Lainà et al., 2015) and represents how much is 
the total amount of loans to the private sector secured by deposits. As said earlier, one of 
the roles of the banking system is to transform maturities, and this ratio demonstrates how 
well they do it. The latter was retrieved from the International Monetary Fund (2018).  
Terms of trade, used as a predictor in previous studies (Hamdaoui, 2016), is also 
included, and it demonstrates a country’s trading efficiency through subtracting the 
capacity of importing to the capacity of exporting goods and services. It is defined as the 
percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, 
measured relative to the base year (WDI, 2018).  The last indicator is M2 to reserves, and 
it captures the external environments that countries encounter by measuring the broad 
money (M2) as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves. The total amount of broad 
money was collected from Jordà’s et al., (2017) database, and it is defined as the sum of 
currency in circulations, overnight deposits, deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two 
years and deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months (ECB, 2018). The 
outstanding amount of foreign exchange reserves, which includes a countries’ holdings 





of foreign currencies and gold, and terms of trade were retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators database. 
5.2.2 Regression Model 
 The models used to estimate the following equations are the OLS linear 
probability model and the logit model, as performed by Schularick & Taylor (2012). This 
last model has been commonly used due to its ability of estimating binary outcomes 
(Hedin & Johansson, 2017; Jordà et al., 2014; Bordo & Meissner, 2012). 
5.2.2.1 Financial Crisis  
First, I will test which of the variables present on table IV have the capacity to 
predict financial crises. I will use a single equation that estimates the probability of a 
systemic banking crisis, in country i in year t, as a function of all the variables: 







it-1) + φ2(DEBTGDPit-1) + φ3(CAit-1) + 
                                 φ
4
(STIRit-1) + φ5(HOUSEPit-1)+ φ6(MORTLOANit-1) + 
                                       φ
7
(NMORTLOANit-1)+ φ8(CREDITit-1)+ 
                                      φ
9
(M2RESERVESit-1)+ φ10(TERMSTRADEit-1)+               
                                      φ
11
(LDEPOSITSit-1)+ εit 
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term, which is assumed to be well behaved
4. 
 The following procedure involves testing for how many years credit must evolve 
to affect the probability of a banking crisis.  Following Bordo & Meissner (2012), the 
subsequent equation was used: 
                                                 
4 When a variable is said to be well behaved, this means that it follows a normal distribution. In this case, 
εit ~ 𝑁(0~, 𝜎
2) 












(CREDITit-1)+ φ2(CREDITit-2)+  
                               φ
3
(CREDITit-3)+ φ4(CREDITit-4)+ φ5(CREDITit-5) + εit 
Where 𝜀𝑡 is the error term, which is assumed to be well behaved. As in Schularick & 
Taylor (2012), it is considered an annual lag length, P, of 5 as credit booms are considered 
to last for several years. The models used to estimate equation (1) and (2) are the OLS 
linear probability model and the logit model. 
5.2.2.2 Credit Growth  
 The next step is to investigate which variables of table III are determinants of 
credit growth. This study is important because if some variable does not affect directly 
the probability of a financial crises, it can influence it through credit growth. For that 
matter, the following regression was used: 
(3)       CREDITit = φ0+ φ1(RGDPit-1) + φ2(DEBTGDPit-1) + φ3(CAit-1)+φ4(STIRit-1)+ 
   φ
5
(HOUSEPit-1)+ φ6(MORTLOANit-1) +φ7(NMORTLOANit-1)+  
   φ
8
(M2RESERVESit-1)+φ9(TERMSTRADEit-1)+ φ10(LDEPOSITSit-1)+εit 
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term, which is assumed to be well behaved. As in equation (1), 
these indicators are lagged by one year. 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 To fit the regression, it was computed the lagged first difference of every variable, 
except for the current account to GDP and terms of trade variables, in which was only 





computed the first difference. Table VIII discloses the descriptive statistics of the 
variables after this transformation and it can be found in the appendix. 
5.3.2 Correlation matrix 
 To analyze the correlation between the variables, a Pearson correlation matrix was 
constructed (table IX, in appendix). Overall, the indicators do not show high levels of 
correlation among themselves, however, there are some special cases. The strongest 
correlation in this dataset seems to be between house prices and real GDP per capita, 
demonstrating a linear correlation of 0.910. This implies that these variables are able to 
jointly explain a certain characteristic or event. 
6. Results 
6.1 Financial crises 
6.1.1 Analyzing all predictors 
 Table V summarizes the results of equation (1) that studies all the variables’ 
predicting abilities.  It is possible to verify that all indicators are jointly statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the OLS and logit models. The main estimator, credit 
growth, is statistically significant and has a negative sign, which does not comprise the 
results found by Bordo & Meissner (2012) and Schularick & Taylor (2012), as they found 
the opposite relationship between both variables. The statistical result implies that when 
credit increases from a year to another, the probability of facing a banking crisis, in the 
following year, decreases. Consequently, this finding demonstrates that yearly credit 
increases are not as dangerous as before, which might be related to the post-crisis 
regulation that was imposed all over the world. However, it is still important to follow 





credit trends to see if this evolution is alarming, analyzing its causes and possible 
consequences. 
Regarding the credit types analyzed, the annual change in mortgage loans is 
statistically significant at a 10% level, unlike non-mortgage loans’ yearly-evolution. Due 
to its positive estimator, the probability of a banking crisis is higher when mortgage loans 
increase, which resembles previous findings (Jordà et al., 2014). This result reminds the 
importance of analyzing the most important drives of the GFC, as they are still variables 
that have a considerable impact on the economy. 




     LOGIT 
  
Variables B T B Wald 
(Constant) 0.069 5.106*** -4.010 38.11** 
RGDP -2.067 -5.683*** -48.273 4.674*** 
DEBTGDP 0.022 0.282 0.203 0.004 
CREDIT -0.265 -3.258** -10.223 0.34*** 
STIR -0.086 -4.677*** -0.947 3.344 
HOUSEP 0.043 0.429 -1.145 0.035 
CAGDP -0.433 -0.824 1.836 0.008 
MORTLOAN 0.229 1.844* 8.894 0.699 
NMORTLOAN 0.095 0.834 -1.531 0.026 
M2RESERVES -0.060 -2.125** -1.327 2.037 
LDEPOSITS 0.074 0.810 4.317 1.800 
TERMSTRADE 0.009 1.928* 0.429 6.33 
R2 0.197 0.126 
Adj.𝑅2 0.180 - 
Pseudolikelihood - 79.668 
Test statistics
a
 11.363*** 70.204*** 
          Notes: a - The reported statistic is F for the OLS model and 𝑥2 for the logit model. 
* Significance at 10% level 
**Significance at 5% level 
  ***Significance at 1% level 
 
Real GDP per capita is statistically significant at 1% level in the OLS and logit 
models, being negatively related to banking crises. This evidence is consistent with the 





findings of Büyükkarabacak & Valev (2010), in which they claim that poorer economies 
are more likely to face a financial crisis as they might have more difficulties in absorbing 
the negative impact of an economic shock. Short-term interest rates have significance at 
the same level as the previous variable, and its coefficient shows a negative sign, implying 
that an increase in this variable, increases the likelihood of a banking crises. This relation 
was expected, as people tend to borrow more when credit is cheaper.  If these increases 
last for a considerable period, they may ignite a credit boom which can be very dangerous 
to the economy. 
The M2 to foreign exchange reserves ratio is statistically significant at a 5% level, 
only in the OLS model, being negatively related to banking crisis. Therefore, there is 
evidence that a decrease in this ratio is associated to a higher probability of facing a crisis 
in the following year. As said earlier, this variable is composed by the total amount of 
money supply of a country and the total amount of foreign exchange reserves. A reduction 
in the first leads to a decrease in the amount of money that households and firms hold, 
therefore, they will spend less, save less and have more difficulties in repaying their debt. 
Regarding the second element, its reduction implies that the economic system is more 
fragile as it will have less monetary capacity to face negative shocks to the national 
currency.  
Regarding not statistically significant estimators, house prices growth was the 
variable with the highest expectation of predicting a banking crisis due to its relevance in 
previous literature (Kemme & Roy 2012; Lainà et al. 2015). This result demonstrates that 
house prices do not affect, directly, banking crises; however, they can influence it through 
other variables, like credit. This mismatch of results maybe associated to the usage of 
different models to analyze the sample or to the sample itself. Loans-to-deposits ratio, 





current account-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP are not statistically significant, 
indicating that these variables do not have a direct influence on the probability of 
occurrence a banking crisis. Despite of the statistical insignificance of these variables, the 
relation between them and the likelihood of a banking crisis can change if these indicators 
are studied through a longer period, in which it is possible to capture trends that might 
have interesting information. 
6.1.2 Analyzing credit growth 
 Table VI reports the results of equation (2), which estimates the predicting 
abilities of credit growth lagged up to five years. The output illustrates that credit growth 
lagged one year is statistically significant and its estimator has a negative sign, as was 
reported on table V.  
Table VI - Financial crisis: Credit lagged 5 years 
      OLS    LOGIT 
Variables B      T  B Wald 
(Constant) 0.019 1.81* -4.422 74.179*** 
CREDIT1 -0.989 -3.296** -22.786 5.375** 
CREDIT2 0.252 0.803 5.033 0.207 
CREDIT3 -0.185 -0.585 -7.096 0.363 
CREDIT4 0.546 1.832* 17.725 2.468 
CREDIT5 -0.185 -1.205 -5.574 0.868 
R2 0.045 0.036 
Adjus. R2  0.037 - 
Pseudolikelihood - 132.015 
Test statistics
a
 5.343 21.017 
Notes: a - The reported statistic is F for the OLS model and 𝑥2 for the logit model. 
* Significance at 10% level 
**Significance at 5% level 
   ***Significance at 1% level 
 
Credit growth lagged 4 years is also statistically significant with a positive 
coefficient, meaning that it is associated to a higher probability of experiencing a financial 
crisis. Hence, credit booms that started 4 years prior, are the most significant and, 





consequently, the most interesting to study when analyzing the EU banking sector. Unlike 
former research, there is no evidence that the remaining types of credit growth are 
statistically significant (Bordo & Meissner, 2012; Schularick & Taylor, 2012).  In the OLS 
model, the sum of the lag coefficients is, approximately, -0.561 and the standard deviation 
of real loan growth over five years is 0.153. This implies that a continued five-year rise 
of one standard deviation in this variable is associated to a decrease of 0.086 in the 
probability of a banking crisis. This finding does not follow the results of Schularick & 
Taylor (2012), however this difference may be related to the new conscious behavior that 
the banking sector and its participants have regarding credit growth and its consequences 
for the economy. 
6.2 Credit growth determinants 
 Table VII summarizes the relation between credit growth and the independent 
variables from equation (3), which was estimated using the OLS model.  
Table VII - Credit growth: Explanatory variables 
Variables B T 
(Constant) 0,011 3,619** 
RGDP 0,788 8,602** 
DEBTGDP -0,087 -4,896** 
STIR -0,009 -2,235* 
HOUSEP 0,062 2,62** 
CAGDP -0,11 -0,916 
MORTLOAN 0,386 13,06** 
NMORTLOAN 0,305 12,658** 
M2RESERVES 0,007 1,131 
LDEPOSITS -0,009 -0,448 
TERMSTRADE 0,004 4,223** 
R^2 0,778 
Adjust R^2 0,606 
F-Statistic 78,194** 
*Significance at 5% level 
   **Significance at 1% level 





It is possible to confirm that almost every variable has a statistically significant 
estimator, which proposes that they can affect credit growth and, consequently, influence 
the predictability of a banking crisis. There is a strong positive relation between the annual 
changes of GDP per capita and credit growth, implying that when GDP is growing, the 
credit levels will also increase. This connection is positive to an economy when GDP 
growth is followed by an increase in income, investment and output and a decrease in 
unemployment, which makes any economy more powerful and resourceful.  
However, one must consider the negative side of this relationship. During the 
upswing of a cycle, i.e when GDP is growing, the risk associated to loans becomes 
underestimated, which may lead to a rapid and unsustainable expansion of credit (Kelly 
et al., 2013).  Consequently, the level non-performing loans may increase, making the 
banks’ balance sheets weaker and more vulnerable to shocks. 
Public debt-to-GDP has a negative and statistically significant estimator, implying 
that as government debt increases, the amount of total lending decreases. This result 
follows the findings of Bonis & Stacchini (2010) and suggests that public debt rises is not 
just a consequence of banking crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009), it can also be one of its 
drivers.  A rise in public debt can be beneficial to a country’s economy, in the short-term, 
if the funds collected are used to invest in economic growth. As so, when used correctly, 
for example, to build and repair roads, improve education, improve the health system, etc; 
it may improve the population’s living standards. Consequently, the need for credit may 
decrease as households have more income to spend on other goods and services that they 
could not afford before. However, in the long term, the continuous increase in public debt 
might make credit institutions more conservative about lending money. As countries get 
more indebted, their governments often apply austerity measures to reduce their debt 





levels, namely after adverse reactions from financial markets. These measures will affect 
directly the population’s living standards making them less wealthy and, therefore, less 
able to repay their loans. Hence, knowing this snowball-effect in advance, CI will tend to 
reduce the amount of credit granted, during public debt rises, to mitigate non-performing 
loans in their portfolio and to react to the usual funding constrains. 
The changes in short-term interest rates show a negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that credit growth increases when short-term interest rates 
decrease, which is consistent with the findings of Bordo & Meissner (2012). Usually, 
central banks use short-term interest rates to manipulate the inflation rate. When the first 
one decreases, the amount of credit borrowed will increase and, consequently, there will 
be more money to spend by consumers. This boosts economic growth and, ultimately, 
increases inflation. 
Regarding the two credit types, as expected, they are both statistically significant 
at 1% level, being mortgage loans slightly more relevant in explaining the level of credit 
growth. This relation indicates that an increase in mortgage loans has a higher impact on 
total credit than an increase in non-mortgage loans, illustrated by the coefficient value of 
0.386 of the former, compared to 0.305 of the latter. 
House price growth is statistically significant at 1% level and its coefficient 
implies a positive association with the dependent variable. This result is in line with 
Kemme & Roy (2012), who find that house prices are a good predictor of banking crises. 
House price increases can be very dangerous, especially if credit follows this asset price 
trend, as it will become an unsustainable situation where borrowers will not be able to 
repay their mortgage loans because income did not follow the evolution of asset prices. 





Hence, banks will have more non-performing loans and real estate properties on their 
balance sheet, which lead to an extreme level of instability of the banking system. 
Terms of trade-to-GDP also shows a strong and significant relation with credit 
growth. This outcome demonstrates that when the trade balance has positive annual 
changes, i.e when the level of exports is increasing faster than the level of imports, total 
lending is going to increase. This relation may represent the need for credit that 
enterprises have when their business is expanding cross-border, which may influence 
positively economic growth and consequently, reduce the probability of a crisis. Lastly, 
the current account-to-GDP, the M2 to reserves ratio and the ratio of loans-to-deposits do 
not have statistical significance in explaining credit growth. 
7. Conclusions and future research proposals 
7.1 Conclusion 
This study analyzes the variables that are more appropriated to predict a banking 
crisis in the European Union, with a special focus on households and enterprises’ credit 
growth. 
 The results show that it is possible to predict a financial crisis in the EU and that 
credit growth is a good indicator. Previous studies (Bordo & Meissner, 2012; Schularick & 
Taylor, 2012) found that when credit was growing for five years, the probability of facing 
a banking crisis increased. However, this new dataset does not provide the same 
conclusion since there is no statistical relationship between crisis events and credit growth 
for five years.  
This may be explained by the fact that when credit is growing for such a long 
period, measures that aim to control this variable are applied to the banking system, 





preventing another financial disaster.  Overall, there is statistical evidence that when 
credit is growing for four years, the likelihood of facing a financial crisis, in the following 
year, increases. This new finding may be associated to the awareness of regulatory 
authorities regarding credit growth and its consequences for the economy.  
 Additionally, it is demonstrated that non-mortgage loans can influence positively 
both credit growth and banking crisis, being significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Despite of not explaining banking crisis, unlike the findings of Jordà et al. (2014), the 
growth of mortgage loans  is the strongest variable affecting total credit, demonstrating 
that it is still, necessary to monitor the evolution of these loans, due to their historical 
relevance and their repercussions to the economy.  
Focusing on the variable that represents the price of the collateral of mortgage 
loans, there is strong evidence that house prices growth positively correlated to total 
lending, implying that the latter increases as house prices increase. This relationship is 
very dangerous, as it can turn into an unsustainable situation where borrowers will not be 
able to repay their loans, which leads to an extreme level of instability of the baking 
system. 
The results also suggest that low-income economies have a higher likelihood of 
facing a crisis, as poorer economies are have less resources to face any shock on the 
economy. However, financial fragility can also appear when GDP is growing, as the credit 
risk may be underestimated, leading to a rapid expansion of credit (Kelly et al., 2013). 
Regarding the current account, it is also an interesting variable to study when analyzing 
banking crises, but it is important to understand the reasons behind that evolution and 
their consequences for the economy. 





To my understanding, there are no papers that focus only on the EU countries 
presented by Jordà et al., (2017) and in the same time horizon as my study. However, this 
dissertation is comparable to previous literature due to the subject under analysis. 
Financial crises depend on the economy and the latter is constantly changing, the 
comparison with prior findings that used an older time period are very interesting to 
understand how the economy has evolved. The papers that analyze time periods between 
1870 and 2008 (Bordo & Meissner, 2012; Schularick & Taylor, 2012; Kirschenmann et al., 
2016), do not consider in their data, the post-events of the GFC. This new information 
contain valuable contributes to the overall predicting abilities of the variables, as it was 
shown. The main difference between this analysis and previous literature is that it reflects 
a more conscious and conservative behavior of the banking system towards significant 
changes in the economy. Suffering from almost two simultaneous crises, the euro-zone 
has gain knowledge to prevent a future one, however as the world keeps changing, new 
indicators may appear and influence the probability of having a banking crisis. In this 
case, it is crucial for Central Banks to follow all the new market trends and testing for 
their possible repercussions in the economy. 
7.2 Future research proposals 
 Financial crises are very complex events that are influenced by a variety of factors 
that are constantly changing, so every additional study that contributes with a new time-
period and indicators, can offer new insights on the current economy. Hence, the first 
suggestion to future researches is to include an up-to-date period to always capture these 
modifications. It would also be interesting to analyze all the 28 countries belonging to the 
EU, to have a more complete analysis, mirroring the EU reality. In future researches, it 
could be included more variables that previously explained financial crises. As for 





example, income inequality (Bordo & Meissner, 2012; Kirschenmann et al., 2016), stock 
prices (Kirschenmann et al., 2016; Hatzius et al., 2010), capital flows (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
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      Table VIII - Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CRISIS 0.032 0.000 0.177 0.000 1.000 
RGDP 0.016 0.021 0.070 -1.099 0.093 
DEBTGDP 0.015 0.010 0.124 -1.221 0.713 
CREDIT 0.052 0.044 0.289 -2.536 5.999 
STIR -0.074 -0.014 0.458 -2.643 3.138 
HOUSEP 0.052 0.059 0.239 -4.089 0.617 
CAGDP 0.000 0.000 0.016 -0.101 0.065 
MORTLOAN 0.026 0.026 0.080 -1.210 0.269 
NMORTLOAN 0.013 0.015 0.077 -0.326 0.629 
M2RESERVES 0.011 0.025 0.253 -2.531 1.735 
LDEPOSITS 0.010 0.006 0.083 -0.486 0.991 
TERMSTRADE -0.108 0.001 2.387 -39.190 11.202 
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Table IX - Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  CRISIS RGDP DEBTGDP CREDIT STIR HOUSEP CAGDP MORTLOAN NMORTLOAN M2RESERVES LDEPOSITS TERMSTRADE 
CRISIS 
1                       
                        
RGDP 
-0.152** 1                     
(0.000)                       
DEBTGDP 
0.155** 0.171** 1                   
(0.000) (0.000)                     
CREDIT 
-0.042 -0.847** -0.438** 1                 
(0.167) (0.000) (0.000)                   
STIR 
-0.322** -0.109** -0.261** 0.352** 1               
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)                 
HOUSEP 
-0.069 0.910** 0.192** -0.850** -0.159** 1             
(0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)               
CAGDP 
0.086* -0.245** 0.091* 0.065 -0.117** -0.248** 1           
(0.024) (0.000) (0.019) (0.068) (0.004) (0.000)             
MORTLOAN 
0.053 0.609** 0.157** -0.580** -0.233** 0.670** -0.225** 1         
(0.114) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
NMORTLOAN 
-0.071 -0.177** -0.219** 0.375** 0.223** -0.150** -0.203** -0.057 1       
(0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.096)         
M2RESERVES 
-0.108** 0.053 -0.094* -0.012 0.039 0.042 -0.075* 0.056 0.074* 1     
(0.007) (0.113) (0.016) (0.395) (0.185) (0.171) (0.043) (0.102) (0.046)       
LDEPOSITS 
-0.010 0.117** -0.086* -0.042 0.105** 0.145** -0.105** 0.187** 0.261** 0.031 1   
(0.412) (0.004) (0.024) (0.172) (0.008) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.241)     
TERMSTRADE 
0.082* 0.045 -0.027 -0.036 -0.094* 0.042 0.107** 0.086* -0.220** 0.021 -0.020 1 
(0.031) (0.150) (0.268) (0.208) (0.016) (0.170) (0.007) (0.025) (0.000) (0.312) (0.326)   
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  The 2-talied significances are in parenthesis. 
 
